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Over-optimism in forecasts by ofﬁcial
budget agencies and its implications
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Abstract The paper studies forecasts of real growth rates and budget balances made by ofﬁcial government
agencies among 33 countries. In general, the forecasts are found: (i) to have a positive average bias, (ii) to be
more biased in booms, and (iii) to be even more biased at the 3-year horizon than at shorter horizons. This
over-optimism in ofﬁcial forecasts can help explain excessive budget deﬁcits, especially the failure to run
surpluses during periods of high output: if a boom is forecasted to last indeﬁnitely, retrenchment is treated as
unnecessary. Many believe that better ﬁscal policy can be obtained by means of rules such as ceilings for the
deﬁcit or, better yet, the structural deﬁcit. But we also ﬁnd: (iv) countries subject to a budget rule, in the form
of euroland’s Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), make ofﬁcial forecasts of growth and budget deﬁcits that are
even more biased and more correlated with booms than do other countries. This effect may help explain
frequent violations of the SGP. The question becomes how to overcome governments’ tendency to satisfy
ﬁscal targets by wishful thinking rather than by action. Chile in 2000 created structural budget institutions that
may have solved the problem. Independent expert panels, insulated from political pressures, are responsible
for estimating the long-run trends that determine whether a given deﬁcit is deemed structural or cyclical. The
result is that Chile’s ofﬁcial forecasts of growth and the budget have not been overly optimistic, even in
booms. Unlike many countries in the North, Chile took advantage of the 2002–7 expansion to run budget
surpluses, and so was able to ease in the 2008–9 recession.
Key words: budget rule, Chile, countercyclical, ﬁscal, forecast, institutions, procyclical, Stability and
Growth Pact, structural budget
JEL classiﬁcation: E62, H50
I. Introduction
Many countries are apparently unable to bring budget deﬁcits under control though eager to
do so. This used to be less true of countries in the ‘North’, those traditionally known as
industrialized, than of those in the ‘South’—that is to say, developing countries. The problem
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 of the former has gotten worse since 2000, however—the same period during which many of
the latter have escaped their past history of excessive deﬁcits and debts, attaining smaller
deﬁcits or even surpluses.
The problem in the North is worse than just a tendency towards excessive budget deﬁcits
on average. Some advanced countries have followed generally procyclical ﬁscal policies
since 2000: taking steps to cut tax rates and increase spending during expansion and then
moving in the opposite direction in response to recession. This pattern is likely to exacerbate
the swing in the business cycle. Because the United States, the United Kingdom, and most
members of the eurozone failed to take advantage of the expansion of 2002–7 to attain budget
surpluses, after global recession hit in 2008–9 they found themselves with such high levels of
debt that they felt constrained to tighten ﬁscal policy. Meanwhile, China, Chile, Korea, and
some other emerging market or commodity-producing countries had attained sufﬁciently
strong ﬁscal positions by 2007 that they felt able to respond to the recession with substantial
easing; this helps explain why they experienced a shorter and less severe downturn.
There is a huge public choice literature offering political economy explanations for
excessive growth of government spending and budget deﬁcits. Budget deﬁcits are often
viewed as the product of politicians who have short horizons. Short horizons can in turn be
rational under a system where politicians’ terms in ofﬁce are typically short and their
priorities for what they would like to spend money on differ from those of their opponents.
1
Dispersed political power has not only been associated with ﬁscal policies that are
excessively expansionary on average but also with those that are excessively procyclical.
2
Other explanations for budget deﬁcits abound as well.
3
Of the various ways that governments can fail to save enough, especially in boom times,
this paper studies the possibility that ofﬁcial forecasts of revenue are overly optimistic. If the
ofﬁcial forecast is optimistic, there is no reason to take painful steps such as cutting spending
or raising taxes. A prominent example is the overly optimistic US budget forecasts made by
the White House in 2001 and subsequent years. Its unrealistic forecasts were plausibly
a major reason for the failure of the United States to take advantage of the opportunity to save
during the 2002–7 expansion.
4 European governments, too, persistently explained away
large deﬁcits during this period with unrealistic predictions that in the coming years the
deﬁcits would fall.
Are such instances of over-optimism in ofﬁcial forecasts systematic enough to be
statistically signiﬁcant? Is the forecasting bias worse during periods of expansion? What is
the role of budget rules, such as the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)? How can the problem
of excessive exuberance on the part of ﬁscal authorities during booms be addressed? This
paper explores the bias towards over-optimism in ofﬁcial forecasts of GDP and budget
balances among 33 countries. The bias probably contributes to excessive deﬁcits. A common
1 For example, Alesina and Tabellini (1990a,b) and Grilli et al. (1991). Roubini and Sachs (1989a,b) argue that
the problem may especially result from difﬁculties that multi-party coalition governments have in forming
consensus.
2 Lane (2003). Countries with volatile output are also prone to procyclical ﬁscal policy.
3 Surveys include Alesina et al. (1998) and Persson and Tabellini (2002).
4 The White House claim in 2001 that budget surpluses over the subsequent 10 years would total nearly $5
trillion, in round numbers, was a major factor in the political ability of the new administration to persuade the
Congress to approve long-term tax cuts and spending increases. The outcome was that the 10-year US ﬁscal outlook
soon swung to a cumulative $5 trillion deﬁcit. One component of the over-optimism was a belief that tax cuts would
stimulate economic growth so much they would raise tax revenue rather than lowering it (Frankel, 2003, 2008b).
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 prescription for excessive deﬁcits is a budget rule. But we ﬁnd that a rule such as the SGP
only worsens the bias towards over-optimism in ofﬁcial forecasts: political leaders meet their
targets by adjusting their forecasts rather than by adjusting their policies. The paper ﬁnds
a possible solution in Chile’s structural budget institutions, particularly its insulation of
ofﬁcial forecasts from political temptation.
II. Are ofﬁcial budget forecasts overly optimistic on
average?
There is already evidence that government budget forecasts in many countries are overly
optimistic on average, often because ofﬁcial estimates of economic growth are overly
optimistic.
Studies of growth forecasts by US government agencies in the 1960s and 1970s used to
ﬁnd them generally unbiased and as accurate as private-sector forecasts. But subsequent
analyses found bias. McNees (1995) updated the time sample to 1994 and found an
optimistic bias in some ofﬁcial forecasts of long-term growth. Auerbach (1994) found overly
optimistic forecasts in the decade preceding 1993. Auerbach (1999) again found a tendency
for the US Ofﬁce of Management and Budget (OMB), in its semi-annual forecast, to
overestimate revenues during the period 1986–93, but found a tendency to underestimate
revenues during the period 1993–9. McNab et al. (2007) ﬁnd that OMB’s 1-year ahead
forecasts of US tax receipts were biased over the period 1963–2003. They suggest that the
bias may be strategic on the part of various administrations seeking to achieve particular
goals, such as overstating budget balance when the administration is seeking to increase
spending or cut taxes. Frendreis and Tatalovich (2000) ﬁnd that US administrations (OMB)
are less accurate in estimating growth, inﬂation, and unemployment than are the independent
Congressional Budget Ofﬁce and Federal Reserve Board. They ﬁnd partisan bias, which they
interpret as Republican administrations over-forecasting inﬂation and Democratic admin-
istrations over-forecasting unemployment.
Forni and Momigliano (2004) ﬁnd optimism bias among OECD countries more generally.
Ashiya (2007) ﬁnds that ofﬁcial Japanese growth forecasts at a 16-month horizon are biased
upwards by 0.7 percentage points, and signiﬁcantly less accurate than private-sector
forecasts. Canada evidently underestimated its budget deﬁcits in the late 1980s and early
1990s, but subsequently (1994–2004) overestimated them, perhaps to reduce the risk of
missing its target of a balanced budget under its strengthened institutional framework
(O’Neill, 2005; Mu ¨hleisen et al., 2005).
Jonung and Larch (2006) ﬁnd a clear tendency for EU governments, when making budget
plans, to overestimate the economic growth rate. The tendency towards overly optimistic
forecasts is notably strong in Italy (the average bias is around 0.6 percentage points per year)
and Germany. The UK is the exception. A three-author team ﬁnds a statistically signiﬁcant
optimism bias for some euro members: France, Italy, and Portugal over the period 1991–
2002 (Strauch et al., 2004); and Germany, Italy, Greece, Luxemburg, and Portugal when the
data set is updated to 2004 (Von Hagen et al., 2009). The UK, Finland, and Sweden, on the
other hand, tend to overestimate their deﬁcits. In light of this difference, it is suggestive that
the UK and Sweden were not trying to get into the euro, which was supposed to require
meeting the ﬁscal criteria of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, while the others were trying to get
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 in, and are now there and thus subject to the SGP.
5 Bru ¨ck and Stephan (2006) explicitly
conclude that eurozone governments have manipulated deﬁcit forecasts before elections
since the introduction of the SGP. Most of these authors argue that the systematic over-
optimism in ex ante forecasts translates directly into larger ex post deﬁcits, and particularly to
deﬁcits larger than targeted under the SGP.
Similarly, Beetsma et al. (2009) ﬁnd that ex post budget balances among SGP countries
systematically fall short of ofﬁcial ex ante plans. Marinheiro (2010) adds another complete
business cycle to the data under the SGP, and again ﬁnds that the forecasts of European ﬁscal
authorities are overly optimistic on average. This evidence is not consistently strong across
the set of 15 EU countries, but the bias is high for France, Italy, and Portugal at all forecast
horizons.
6 Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) and Beetsma et al. (2011) decompose the overall
optimism bias in the budget forecasts of EU governments into the component that arises
between initial plans and the ﬁrst release of actual budget numbers, and the component that
arises between the ﬁrst release and the ﬁnal revised budget numbers.
There is far less research into the forecasting records of ﬁscal authorities in low-income or
medium-income countries than in advanced countries. One reason is limited availability of
data. But some major emerging market countries became more transparent about their
budgets after the crises of the 1990s.
We were able to obtain government forecasts of the budget balance for 33 countries. A
majority of the countries are European (26, of whom 17 are euro members, counting Estonia,
which was approved for membership in 2010). The heavy representation of these countries in
the sample is because, unlike most countries, they report ofﬁcial budget forecast data—as
a side-effect of the SGP itself. But the European data will allow us, below, to test for the
effect on forecast bias of the political pressure from a budget rule such as the SGP. Of the
additional seven countries, three are advanced commodity-exporting countries (Australia,
Canada, and New Zealand), three are middle-sized emerging market countries that also
export commodities (Chile, Mexico, and South Africa), and the last is the United States.
Emerging markets are under-represented; but national sources must be consulted one by one,
and for most countries the answer is that such data are not available, and perhaps do not exist
in cumulative form even inside the government.
Appendix Table 1 reports the mean errors country by country. The fourth column reports
the ofﬁcial ex ante forecast minus actual ex post outcome 1 year ahead: mean forecast error,
minimum, and maximum. Some countries report forecasts 2 or 3 years ahead; these forecast
errors are shown in the ﬁfth and sixth columns, respectively. The general pattern, as
suspected, is over-optimism. In most cases, the positive bias emerges more strongly at the
3-year horizon than the 2-year horizon, and more at the 2-year horizon than the 1-year
horizon. The average across all countries is an upward bias of 0.2 per cent of GDP at the
1-year horizon, 0.8 per cent 2 years ahead, and a hefty 1.5 per cent 3 years ahead. It is no
surprise that the absolute magnitude of forecast errors increases with the length of the
horizon; this would be true even if forecasts were optimal. But the term structure of the bias
suggests that the longer the horizon and the greater the genuine uncertainty, the more the
scope for wishful thinking.
5 Indeed, Sweden’s strategy for staying out may have been to feign ﬁscal imprudence!
6 He proposes delegating the macroeconomic forecasting to supranational authorities, such as the EU
Commission or the International Monetary Fund.
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 If bias in forecasts is a reason for excessive deﬁcits in booms, one would expect the
problem to be worse in developing countries. Many authors have documented that ﬁscal
policy has tended to be procyclical in developing and commodity-exporting countries, in
comparison with industrialized countries.
7 Most studies look at the procyclicality of
government spending, because tax receipts are particularly endogenous with respect to the
business cycle. An important reason for procyclical spending is precisely that government
receipts from taxes or royalties rise in booms, and the government cannot resist the
temptation or political pressure to increase spending proportionately, or more than
proportionately. Procyclicality has historically been especially pronounced in countries that
possess natural resources and where income from those resources tends to dominate the
business cycle.
8
Interestingly, the bias in our sample of 33 countries is not greater for commodity producers
or developing countries than it is for others, even though such countries have been observed
to have more highly procyclical ﬁscal policies historically than advanced countries. The US
and UK forecasts have substantial positive biases around 3 per cent of GDP at the 3-year
horizon (approximately equal to their actual deﬁcit on average; in other words, on average
they repeatedly forecast a disappearance of their deﬁcits that never came). The forecast biases
in the euro countries have already been noted from the literature. But ofﬁcial budget forecasts
in South Africa were overly pessimistic on average, as were those for Canada and New
Zealand. Mexico is just slightly overoptimistic on average. Chile had no optimism bias; the
conclusion of this paper will be that this achievement was the result of admirable budget
institutions that insulate the forecasting process from political pressure.
9
III. Are ofﬁcial growth forecasts overly optimistic
on average?
One likely reason for upward bias in ofﬁcial budget forecasts, in advanced and developing
countries alike, is upward bias in economic assumptions, such as economic growth and
commodity prices. This hypothesis is of central interest in the paper. But we should note that
there are other possible reasons as well why ofﬁcial budget forecasts could be overly
optimistic on average. The ofﬁcial forecast may represent the desired target in the plan of the
executive, but there could be slippage by the time the ﬁnal expenditures are made, owing to
the usual political pressures.
10 Those who write the initial budget plan may even be fully
aware of this tendency towards slippage and may place a lower priority on statistically
unbiased forecasts than on setting an ambitious goal so as to achieve as strong a ﬁnal
outcome as possible.
7 Gavin and Perotti (1997), Tornell and Lane (1999), Caldero ´n and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003), Kaminsky et al.
(2005), Talvi and Ve ´gh (2005), Mendoza and Oviedo (2006), Alesina et al. (2008), and Ilzetski and Vegh (2008).
8 Gelb (1986), Cuddington (1989), Medas and Zakharova (2009), Arezki and Bru ¨ckner (2010), and Arezki and
Ismail (2010).
9 I explore Chile’s achievement of countercyclical ﬁscal policy and the role of ofﬁcial forecasts in greater detail
elsewhere: Frankel (2011).
10 Ca ´rdenas et al. (2009) show how this process works for Colombia. There may also be slippage that is not
captured in the ﬁnal budget numbers, because it takes place in ‘off budget’ agencies or categories.
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 Appendix Table 2 reports the mean errors made by government forecasts of the rate of
growth of GDP, for our 33 countries. Again the overall pattern is an upward bias on average,
which rises with the length of the horizon: 0.4 per cent when looking 1 year ahead; 1.1 per
cent at the 2-year horizon; and 1.8 per cent at 3 years. Again, the bias appears in the US and
many other advanced countries, and not necessarily among the commodity producers in this
sample.
11 Chile on average under-forecast its growth rate, by 0.8 per cent at the 1-year
horizon. South Africa was just slightly too optimistic on average (0.2 per cent at the 1-year
horizon), and Mexico more so (1.7 per cent).
Of more central interest for this paper are cyclical patterns in forecast errors. Perhaps the
problem is that government ofﬁcials tend to get carried away during expansions, unrealisti-
cally extrapolating them indeﬁnitely into the future? Fewer authors have looked for cyclical
patterns in the systematic forecast errors made by national authorities than unconditional
average errors. One possible exception: an implication of Marinheiro (2008) seems to be that
European policy-makers have underestimated growth after the trough of the business cycle.
12
IV. The inﬂuence of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations
on budget balances
Before we attempt to detect systematic cyclical patterns in the errors made in ofﬁcial forecast
of budget deﬁcits, it would be useful to conﬁrm that a few macroeconomic variables, such as
the real growth rate, are in fact key to the ex post determination of the actual budget balance.
Then we will know to look to over-optimism in forecasts of these macroeconomic variables
as a possible source of observed over-optimism in budget forecasts.
In Table 1(a) we regress the ex post budget outcome (expressed relative to the ex ante
attempt to predict it) against the ex post real growth rate (again expressed relative to the
forecast), for our full set of countries. At all three horizons, the growth rate is highly
signiﬁcant at determining the budget balance. For every 1 per cent of growth, relative to what
was forecast a year previously, the budget improves by about half that amount, relative to
what was forecast a year previously. The same is true at the 2-year and 3-year horizons. Thus
we are likely to ﬁnd over-optimism in forecasting the budget where we ﬁnd over-optimism in
predicting real growth.
In some countries, inﬂation pushes taxpayers into a higher tax bracket.
13 Accordingly, in
Table 1(b) we add the inﬂation rate as another possible determinant of the budget balance.
(Both are again expressed relative to the ofﬁcial ex ante forecasts.) The ﬁnding is that
11 The commodity exporters in this data set almost certainly represent some sample selection bias, in that only
governments that are transparent enough to publish their budget forecasts are included, for obvious reasons. Thus we
do not emphasize tests of whether ofﬁcial forecasts behave differently for commodity exporters than for others. Such
tests appear to show that the special commodity exporters in our sample are actually less optimistic than others
(Frankel, 2011, Appendix Table 3).
12 The time period is 1999–2006. He is motivated by the ﬁnding of Galı ´ and Perotti (2003) that discretionary
ﬁscal policy became more countercyclical among euro countries after the Maastricht Treaty, and attributes it to
cyclically systematic forecast errors rather than to ex ante intentions on the part of ﬁscal authorities, which were
actually procyclical.
13 At high levels of inﬂation, the Tanzi effect can go the other direction: owing to lags in tax collection, inﬂation
erodes the real value of tax receipts and can worsen the budget deﬁcit.
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 inﬂation does indeed translate into a strong budget surplus, to a statistically signiﬁcant degree
at the 2- and 3-year horizons.
14
V. Are budget forecasts more prone to over-optimism in
booms?
We now return to examination of the cyclical pattern of bias in government forecasts. Table 2
goes beyond testing for unconditional over-optimism in ofﬁcial budget forecasts, to see if the
bias isgreater in a boom, here measured as the deviation of output from a quadratictrend.The
cyclical term is, indeed, positive and highly signiﬁcant: over-optimism tends to be greater in
booms. Its estimated magnitude rises as we move from the 1-year horizon to the 2-year
horizon, and again as we move to the 3-year horizon. This makes sense: there is more scope
Table 1(a): GDP as a determinant of budget balance as a % of GDP
Variables 1 year ahead 2 years ahead 3 years ahead
GDP forecast error 0.479*** 0.525*** 0.489***
(0.060) (0.068) (0.076)
Constant 0.155 0.198 0.556*
(0.174) (0.249) (0.314)
Observations 367 277 175
Countries 33 31 28
R
2 0.280 0.369 0.322
RMSE 1.695 2.053 2.327
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimated with random effects by
country.
Table 1(b): GDP and inﬂation as determinants of budget balance as a % of GDP
Variables 1 year ahead 2 years ahead 3 years ahead
GDP forecast error 0.498*** 0.466*** 0.460***
(0.055) (0.064) (0.074)
Inﬂation forecast error 0.158 0.196* 0.254***
(0.109) (0.116) (0.092)
Constant 0.331 0.593* 0.913**
(0.212) (0.306) (0.356)
Observations 214 185 159
Countries 28 27 27
R
2 0.351 0.402 0.351
RMSE 1.634 2.127 2.313
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Random effects by country. All
variables are lagged so that they line up with the year in which the forecast was made, not the year being forecast.
14 These tables allow random effects by country (which facilitates comparison across the three columns even
thoughthe sample of countriesdiminishes). Results without random effects are reported in the January 2011working
paper (Frankel, 2011). There the effect of inﬂation appeared a bit stronger statistically.
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 for wishful thinking at longer horizons because the uncertainty is genuinely higher. But there
is also evidence of a bias towards optimism even when GDP is at its trend value: the constant
term is positive, and statistically signiﬁcant at the 2- and 3-year horizons.
We have four important ﬁndings so far and they are visible in Figures 1(a–c). First, budget
forecasts in most countries are biased upwards (most points appear above the zero level of
budget prediction error). Second, Chile is an exception (the Xs in Figure 1(a) mostly lie
below the zero level). Third, the bias is greater at longer horizons (compare the ﬁgures with
each other). And fourth, the bias is greater in booms (a regression line slopes upwards).
15
VI. Budget rules
A common prescription to ﬁx budget deﬁcits that are too high on average and too procyclical
is by means of institutions that constrain fallible politicians, such as formal rules to constrain
ﬁscal policy.
16 Examples of such rules are the budget deﬁcit ceilings that supposedly
constrain members of euroland (3 per cent of GDP under the SGP) or US proposals for
a ‘balanced budget amendment’ (zero deﬁcit). But those attempts have failed, in part because
they are too rigid to allow the need for deﬁcits in recessions, counterbalanced by surpluses in
good times.
It is not always the case that ‘tougher’ constraints on ﬁscal policy increase effective budget
discipline. Countries often violate their constraints. In an extreme set-up, a rule that is too
rigid—so rigid that ofﬁcial claims that it will be sustained are not credible—might even lead
to looser ﬁscal outcomes than if a more moderate and ﬂexible rule had been speciﬁed at the
outset (Neut and Velasco, 2003). Certainly euro countries large and small have repeatedly
violated the ﬁscal rules of the SGP, originally a simple ceiling on the budget deﬁcit of 3 per
Table 2: Budget balance forecast error as % of GDP, full dataset
Variables 1 year ahead 2 years ahead 3 years ahead
GDPdevq 0.093*** 0.258*** 0.289***
(0.019) (0.040) (0.063)
Constant 0.201 0.649*** 1.364***
(0.197) (0.231) (0.348)
Observations 398 300 179
R
2 0.033 0.113 0.092
RMSE 2.248 2.732 3.095
Notes: Variable is lagged so that it lines up with the year in which the forecast was made and not the year being
forecast. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country.
15 The country with the longest sample period in Figure 1(a) is Chile (1977–2009). In Figure 1(b) the United
States has the longest sample period (1987–2009). In Figure 1(c) numerous European countries have a sample period
of 2001–9. For the individual country sample periods, see Appendix Table 1.
16 Those who emphasize the role of institutions or rules in delivering more responsible ﬁscal policy include
Buchanan (1967), von Hagen and Harden (1995), Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1996), Poterba (1997), Poterba and von
Hagen (1999), Persson and Tabellini (2004), Wyplosz (2005), Caldero ´n and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008), and Caldero ´n
et al. (2010). For commodity exporters and developing countries more speciﬁcally: Alesina et al. (1999), Stein et al.
(1999), Davis et al. (2001, 2003), and Ossowski et al. (2008), among others.
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 cent of GDP. The main idea that Brussels has had for enforcement of the SGP is that
a government that was unable to reduce its budget deﬁcit to the target would have to pay
a substantial ﬁne, which of course would add to the budget deﬁcit—an enforcement
mechanism that seems unlikely to help the credibility of the rule.
17
Figure 1(a): Chile’s budget forecasts are not prone to the optimism
bias of others
Figure 1(b): The bias is greater at longer horizons than at the 1-year
horizon
17 An analogous example outside the realm of macroeconomic policy is the idea that the Kyoto Protocol on
Global Climate Change would be enforced by a provision requiring countries that exceeded their allocation of
greenhouse-gas emissionsinoneperiodtocut emissionsevenfurther belowtargetin thesubsequentperiod,a penalty
with interest. One might as well tell someonein a diet plan that if they fail to lose 5 pounds in the ﬁrst week, thenthey
have to lose 10 pounds in the second week.
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 Credibility can be a problem for budget institutions either with or without uncertainty
regarding the future path of the economy. Consider ﬁrst the non-stochastic case. Even in
cases where the future proceeds as expected when the rule was formulated, the target may be
up against predictably irresistible political pressures. ‘Special ﬁscal institutions’, which
include ﬁscal rules and ﬁscal responsibility legislation, are often abandoned before long.
18
The case of rules that are too onerous to last arises particularly in the stochastic context. A
target that might have been a reasonable goal ex ante, such as an unconditionally balanced
budget, becomes unreasonable after an unexpected shock, such as a severe fall in export
prices or national output. Common examples are rigid balanced budget rules that do not
allow the possibility of ﬁscal deﬁcits in bad times. A sensible alternative is to specify rules
that mandate changes in response to changed circumstances. Instead of targeting an actual
budget balance of zero, or some other numerical surplus, the rule can target a number for the
structural or cyclically adjusted budget.
Thisalternativemaynot work, however,if the politicalprocessdetermines whethera particular
deﬁcit is judged structural or not. Politicians can always attribute a budget deﬁcit to unexpectedly
and temporarily poor economic growth. Since there is no way of proving what an unbiased
forecast of growth is, there is no way of disproving the politicians’ claim that the shortfall is not
their responsibility. Thus the rule does not necessarily succeed in imposing discipline.
VII. Are ofﬁcial budget forecasts more prone to
over-optimism when the deﬁcit is subject to a rule?
An interesting question is whether a legal agreement to target a particular budget balance can
result in ofﬁcial budget forecasts that have a tendency to be more overly optimistic than they
would otherwise be. Beetsma et al. (2009) use the phrase ‘planning to cheat’ to describe
Figure 1(c): The bias is greater in booms
18 An econometric analysis of these Special Financial Institutions for oil-producersby Ossowski et al. (2008, pp.
19, 23, 24, 38–43) ﬁnds no statistically signiﬁcant effect on the actual ﬁscal stance. This may be partly due to
econometric limitations. But it is evidently also in part due to governments that, after having adopted these
institutions, subsequently ﬁnd them too rigid in practice and so weaken or abandon them.
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 biased forecasts in rule-bound countries. If formal constraints on the budget deﬁcit, by
themselves, are likely to lead to bias in ofﬁcial budget forecasts, they might in theory even
thereby lead to less budget discipline than in a countrywithout rules. The question of whether
rules impair forecasting is distinct, however, from the question of whether rules help deliver
ﬁscal discipline.
19
It is highly suggestive that Italy and other Mediterranean countries, the EU countries that
had to work the hardest to meet the Maastricht ﬁscal criteria, are also the ones found by
several studies to have had the greatest bias in their forecasts. Recall that in the estimates of
Jonung and Larch (2006), the UK is the country that does not show signiﬁcant over-
optimism. Since the UK has not sought entrance into the euro, their ﬁnding is consistent with
the possibility that the bias is euro-related. Beetsma et al. (2010) ﬁnd that in the Netherlands,
forecasts of growth rates (by the Economics Agency) and revenue (by the Finance Ministry)
have been realistic, unlike over-optimistic projections in other EU countries. They attribute
the recent record in part to a new regime of ‘trend-based budget policy’. Thus the literature is
consistent with the hypothesis that formal adoption of a budget deﬁcit ceiling may, by itself,
induce a tendency towards over-optimism in ofﬁcial forecasts, but that over-optimism can be
counteracted by the right sort of ﬁscal regime or institution.
We report our own tests of the ‘planning to cheat’ hypothesis, on a bigger data set than the
earlier studies. The examples of rule-bound countries are the euro members, as in the
literature. But rather than comparing them only to other European countries, we also include
others, including a number of commodity producers.
Table 3(a): Budget balance forecast error as % of GDP, European countries
Variables
1 year
ahead
2 years
ahead
3 years
ahead
1 year
ahead
2 years
ahead
3 years
ahead
SGPdummy 0.136 0.609* 0.372 –0.0842 0.0204 –0.183
(0.342) (0.330) (0.346) (0.333) (0.360) (0.391)
SGP*GDPdevq 0.164** 0.505*** 0.545***
(0.066) (0.135) (0.146)
Constant 0.566** 0.855*** 1.493*** 0.558*** 0.820*** 1.491***
(0.223) (0.289) (0.359) (0.210) (0.292) (0.360)
Observations 255 221 164 254 221 164
Countries 26 26 25 26 26 25
R
2 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.021 0.076 0.076
RMSE 2.162 2.937 3.145 2.178 2.827 3.024
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimated with random effects by
country. European countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.
19 For example, if we ﬁnd a tendency towards overoptimistic forecasts, it could be only a partial offset to tighter
ﬁscal discipline. Or we mayﬁndthat forecastsare not overly optimisticat all, andyet budget deﬁcits couldturn out to
violate legal constraints nonetheless.
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 VIII. Is over-optimism in growth forecasts worse in booms?
We saw above that for most countries, the evolution of the actual budget deﬁcit at a 1-year
horizon is heavily inﬂuenced by the evolution of the economy, particularly GDP. In this
section we test if the cyclical component to errors in budget forecasting derives to some
extent from an analogous cyclical component to errors in economic forecasting. Table 4 tests
if growth forecasts tend to be more overoptimistic when the economy is at a cyclical peak,
here measured as the deviation of GDP from a quadratic trend. The answer is a resounding
yes, especially as the horizon of the forecast lengthens, just as we found with forecasts of the
budget deﬁcit.
The next step, in Tables 5(a–c), is to see if the pattern is worse among rule-bound
countries. In every case, the term that interacts the SGP dummy with GDP has a signiﬁcantly
positive effect on the error made in forecasting output, very much like the positive effect in
forecasting the budget. In other words, when the economy is at a cyclical high in rule-bound
countries, forecasters tend to extrapolate, as if the boom would last forever. The signiﬁcant
Table 3(b): Budget balance forecast error as % of GDP, western European countries
Variables
1 year
ahead
2 years
ahead
3 years
ahead
1 year
ahead
2 years
ahead
3 years
ahead
SGPdummy –0.058 0.886** 1.008*** –0.205 0.351 0.454
(0.331) (0.373) (0.343) (0.333) (0.322) (0.347)
SGP*GDPdevq 0.147** 0.511*** 0.536***
(0.065) (0.162) (0.173)
Constant 0.642** 0.529 0.939 0.608** 0.432 0.937
(0.321) (0.476) (0.605) (0.301) (0.487) (0.613)
Observations 205 181 134 205 181 134
Countries 16 16 15 16 16 15
R
2 0.000 0.011 0.008 0.027 0.010 0.096
RMSE 2.012 2.745 2.954 2.013 2.604 2.818
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. random effects.
Western European countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.
Table 3(c): Budget balance forecast error as a % of GDP, full dataset
Variables
1 year
ahead
2 years
ahead
3 years
ahead
1 year
ahead
2 years
ahead
3 years
ahead
SGPdummy 0.368 0.922*** 0.625 0.182 0.331 0.0663
(0.342) (0.329) (0.415) (0.335) (0.355) (0.449)
SGP*GDPdevq 0.161** 0.509*** 0.544***
(0.065) (0.147) (0.148)
Constant 0.245 0.530** 1.235*** 0.219 0.501* 1.240***
(0.198) (0.268) (0.408) (0.193) (0.268) (0.404)
Observations 399 300 179 398 300 179
Countries 33 31 29 33 31 29
R
2 0.018 0.023 0.008 0.029 0.080 0.076
RMSE 2.113 2.701 3.130 2.122 2.614 3.011
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. random effects. SGP [ dummy
for countries subject to the SGP. GDP devq [ GDP as deviation from trend.
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 Table 4: GDP growth rate forecast error
Variables 1 year ahead 2 years ahead 3 years ahead
GDPdevq 0.204*** 0.497*** 0.668***
(0.033) (0.078) (0.159)
Constant 0.265*** 0.799*** 1.600***
(0.091) (0.130) (0.247)
Observations 368 282 175
Countries 33 31 28
R
2 0.138 0.298 0.303
RMSE 2.234 2.945 3.306
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. Country
random effects. GDP devq [ GDP as deviation from quadratic trend. Variable is lagged so that it lines up with the
year the forecast was made in and not the year being forecast.
Table 5(a): GDP growth rate forecast error, European countries
Variables
1 year
ahead
2 years
ahead
3 years
ahead
1 year
ahead
2 years
ahead
3 years
ahead
SGPdummy 0.183 0.500 –0.670 –0.017 –0.031 –1.175**
(0.232) (0.429) (0.568) (0.248) (0.479) (0.583)
SGP*GDPdevq 0.136** 0.505*** 0.523***
(0.067) (0.138) (0.162)
Constant 0.435** 1.121*** 2.606*** 0.435** 1.085** 2.609***
(0.202) (0.408) (0.703) (0.203) (0.423) (0.702)
Observations 249 219 164 248 219 164
Countries 26 26 25 26 26 25
R
2 0.001 0.002 0.012 0.009 0.040 0.044
RMSE 2.571 3.814 3.896 2.560 3.723 3.810
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country random effects.
Table 5(b): GDP growth rate forecast error, western European countries
Variables
1 year
ahead
2 years
ahead
3 years
ahead
1 year
ahead
2 years
ahead
3 years
ahead
SGPdummy 0.337* 0.963*** 0.699*** 0.153 0.364 0.204
(0.193) (0.228) (0.175) (0.210) (0.274) (0.252)
SGP*GDPdevq 0.144** 0.472*** 0.477***
(0.069) (0.127) (0.135)
Constant 0.197 0.382* 0.814*** 0.197 0.382* 0.814***
(0.191) (0.199) (0.077) (0.192) (0.200) (0.078)
Observations 199 179 134 199 179 134
Countries 16 16 15 16 16 15
R
2 0.008 0.040 0.017 0.031 0.168 0.136
RMSE 1.833 2.340 2.438 1.816 2.184 2.295
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Random effects.
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 positive coefﬁcient on the SGP dummy in Table 4(b) diminishes or even disappears when we
include the interactive term. Evidently the boost that a budget rule gives to the optimism bias,
above and beyond the bias in other countries, comes in booms.
We also tested for signs of forecast bias in potential member countries during the 5 years
preceding successful entrance to the euro. We did ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant upward bias in
their growth forecasts, but no evidence of over-optimism in their budget forecasts (see
Appendix Tables 3(a–d)). A natural interpretation is that the political pressure of the
Maastricht criteria was reﬂected in the actual ex post budget performance—or at least in the
ex post budget numbers reported—because approval of admission was a successful
enforcement mechanism, but that these governments had no incentive to exaggerate their
prospects ahead of time.
IX. Are ofﬁcial forecasts overly optimistic at cyclical lows as
well as highs?
We have noted some evidence consistent with the idea that over-optimism thrives when
genuine uncertainty is higher: the pattern whereby it increases with the horizon of the
forecast. Uncertainty is probably greater at cyclical highs and lows, because it is difﬁcult to
tell whether the recent movement is temporary or permanent. These considerations suggest
a further hypothesis worthy of testing: that forecasts are overly optimistic not just at the top of
the business cycle, but at the bottom as well. The simplest way to test this hypothesis is to
transform our cyclical independent variable, which has been expressed as the deviation of
GDP from trend, to the absolute value of that deviation. Tables 6(a and b) offer strong
support for the hypothesis as a characterization of bias in ofﬁcial forecasts of the budget
balance. Tables 7(a and b) support the hypothesis for bias in ofﬁcial forecasts of economic
growth. (R
2s are higher, too.) Evidently ofﬁcial forecasters are overly optimistic both in
booms and busts, more so than when GDP is at its long-run trend. They over-estimate the
Table 5(c): GDP growth rate forecast error, full dataset
Variables
1 year
ahead
2 years
ahead
3 years
ahead
1 year
ahead
2 years
ahead
3 years
ahead
SGPdummy 0.379* 0.780** –0.555 0.192 0.221 –1.067*
(0.199) (0.352) (0.529) (0.215) (0.410) (0.549)
SGP*GDPdevq 0.148** 0.516*** 0.522***
(0.068) (0.141) (0.161)
Constant 0.239 0.914*** 2.436*** 0.252 0.887*** 2.444***
(0.168) (0.318) (0.643) (0.168) (0.330) (0.642)
Observations 369 282 175 368 282 175
Countries 33 31 28 33 31 28
R
2 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.011 0.042 0.040
RMSE 2.404 3.439 3.811 2.375 3.358 3.726
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. random effects. SGP [ dummy
for countries subject to the SGP. GDP devq [ GDP as deviation from trend. All variables are lagged so that they
line up with the year in which the forecast was made and not the year being forecast.
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 Table 6(a): Budget balance forecast error as a % of GDP, full dataset
Variables 1 year ahead 2 years ahead 3 years ahead
Absolute value of GDPdevq 0.089 0.286*** 0.342***
(0.050) (0.056) (0.097)
Constant 0.088 0.078 0.742**
(0.159) (0.254) (0.319)
Observations 398 300 179
Countries 33 31 29
R
2 0.007 0.060 0.066
RMSE 2.108 2.630 3.021
Notes: GDP devq [ GDP as deviation from quadratic trend. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Country random effects.
Table 6(b): Budget balance forecast error as a % of GDP, European countries
Variables 1 year ahead 2 years ahead 3 years ahead
Absolute value of GDPdevq 0.169*** 0.313*** 0.410***
(0.052) (0.074) (0.103)
Constant 0.185 0.353 0.781**
(0.168) (0.263) (0.330)
Observations 254 221 164
R
2 0.062 0.103 0.106
RMSE 2.227 2.905 3.056
Notes: GDP devq [ GDP as deviation from quadratic trend. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Random effects.
Table 7(a): GDP growth rate forecast error, full dataset
Variables 1 year ahead 2 years ahead 3 years ahead
Absolute value of GDPdevq 0.133 0.531*** 0.743***
(0.106) (0.114) (0.233)
Constant –0.019 –0.255 0.133
(0.242) (0.314) (0.491)
Observations 368 282 175
R
2 0.035 0.201 0.220
RMSE 2.363 3.142 3.594
Note: GDP devq [ GDP as deviation from quadratic trend.
Table 7(b): GDP growth rate forecast error, European countries
Variables 1 year ahead 2 years ahead 3 years ahead
Absolute value of GDPdevq 0.250*** 0.606*** 0.824***
(0.041) (0.093) (0.212)
Constant –0.137 –0.206 0.0932
(0.156) (0.281) (0.448)
Observations 248 219 164
R
2 0.111 0.246 0.257
RMSE 2.420 3.355 3.587
Notes: GDP devq [ GDP as deviation from quadratic trend. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, clustered by country.
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 permanence of the booms and the transitoriness of the busts. The pattern is worse for
Europeans than for others.
X. Proposed solution: follow Chile in insulating budget
forecasting from politics
We have hypothesized that one reason advanced countries have sometimes run excessive
deﬁcits in periods of expansion is excessive optimism in ofﬁcial forecasts of growth rates and
budgets. We then supported the hypothesis with statistical evidence of precisely such a bias.
The paper began, however, by noting that some countries in the South have since 2000
managed to achieve countercyclical policy, taking advantage of the 2002–7 boom years to
attain surpluses. This achievement is all the more remarkable among countries dependent on
exports of minerals and other commodities, because they are the ones that have historically
been especially procyclical. How have they done it?
Consider the especially instructive example of Chile, a country highly dependent on
volatile copper exports.
20 During the years 2003–8 copper prices rose, the economy grew
strongly, and government revenues increased rapidly. Unlike so many other commodity
exporting countries in the past, Chile saved most of this bonanza. Public saving and national
saving both rose strongly. Government debt fell and the sovereign spread gradually declined.
By 2007 Chile had become a net creditor. Its sovereign debt rating climbed above that of its
Latin American neighbours and even ahead of some advanced countries.
By the time copper prices reached a peak in 2008, the political pressure on the government
to spend the revenue had become intense. The insistence of the government on saving the money
for a ‘rainy day’ helped push its poll ratings to very low levels. In 2009, the global recession
hit, copper prices fell sharply, and the Chilean economy turned down as well. Yet, in the span
of 1 year, the polls reversed dramatically: the President and her Finance Minister attained the
highest popularity rating of any ofﬁcials since the restoration of democracy in Chile 20 years
earlier. The reason is that, now that the rainy day had arrived, the government increased spending
liberally, thereby moderating the downturn. It was in a good position to do this, with no loss to its
creditworthiness, because of the exemplary saving that had come before.
How was Chile able to achieve a countercyclical ﬁscal policy during the years 2000–10?
The actions of individual leaders were important. But equally important was an
institutional framework within which the political process operated. Chile introduced
a structural balance regime for ﬁscal policy in 2000 and codiﬁed it legally in 2006. Under
this regime the government must set a structural budget target. It can run a deﬁcit larger
than the target only to the extent that: (i) output falls short of its long-run trend, in
a recession, or (ii) the price of copper is below its 10-year trend. If GDP and the price of
copper are above their long-run trends, the government must save the resulting revenue in
the form of surpluses. The key institutional innovation is that there are two panels of
experts whose job it is each mid-year to make the judgements, respectively, what is the
output gap and what is the medium-term equilibrium price of copper, rather than leaving
the job to government ofﬁcials.
20 Frankel (2011) explains Chile’s structural budget rule in greater detail and gives further references.
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 Chile’s ofﬁcial forecasts have not been subject to the same bias towards over-optimism
that typiﬁes other countries. If anything, its forecasts have erred on the pessimistic side. The
ofﬁcial forecast of real growth has fallen short of the ex post numbers by an average of 0.8 per
cent at the 1-year horizon. The ofﬁcial forecast of the budget surplus as a percentage of GDP
has fallen short of the ex post numbers by an average of 1.4 per cent at the 1-year horizon
(1977–2009). In Figure 1(a), the observations corresponding to Chile are indicated by Xs.
Most lie below the line of zero budget forecast errors and almost all of those that lie above
miss by only a small margin. There is no tendency for the forecast error to rise in booms, as
with other countries.
Chile’s ﬁscal institutions have apparently enabled it to avoid the problem of ofﬁcial
forecasts that fall prey to wishful thinking. Downturns or budget deﬁcits are not explained
away with unrealistic forecasts of dramatic improvement; booms and surpluses are not
unrealistically extrapolated into the future.
Any country could usefully apply variants of the Chilean ﬁscal device. Countries could
set up independent institutions charged by law with estimating the output gap and such
other budget-relevant macroeconomic variables as the inﬂation rate and the fractions of
GDP going to wage versus non-wage income. A useful reinforcement of the Chilean idea
would be to give the panels legal independence. There could be laws protecting them from
being ﬁred, as there are for governors of independent central banks. One could imagine also
broadening the responsibility of such panels beyond simply estimating the long-run trend in
income. The principle of a separation of decision-making powers should be retained,
however: only elected political leaders can determine how spending is allocated or taxes
are raised.
The United Kingdom in 2010 established an Ofﬁce of Budgetary Responsibility (OBR),
designed explicitly to be independent and free of political bias. In addition to making
forecasts, the OBR scrutinizes the Treasury’s costing of budget measures, judges progress
towards the Government’s ﬁscal targets, and assesses the long-term sustainability of the
public ﬁnances. The US Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (CBO), in addition to making
forecasts, estimates the ﬁscal impact of any sort of proposed measures and undertakes a wide
variety of research to aid in federal economic and budgetary decisions.
Formal independence is no guarantee that ﬁscal over-optimism will be eliminated. For one
thing, analysts can make mistakes even if independent. For another thing, politicians can
sometimes ‘game’ the institution. For example, US politicians have legislated tax cuts with
phony expiration dates to force the CBO to issue a baseline forecast of limited revenue loss,
even while they publicly declare their intention to extend the tax cuts when the date of
expiration arrives.
Nevertheless the results of this paper suggest that any institutions that could insulate
budget forecasts from political temptations and make them more realistic could eliminate
a systematic tendency towards over-optimism that in many countries has contributed to
excessive budget deﬁcits in expansions.
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 Appendix Table 1: Errors in forecasting budget surplus (ofﬁcial forecast – actual) expressed as % of GDP
Actual ﬁscal
balance
1 year ahead
budget
forecast error
2 year ahead
budget
forecast error
3 year ahead
budget
forecast error
Australia Mean –0.2 –0.2 –0.2 1.2
1985–2009 Min –2.7 –1.6 –1.4 –0.9
Max 1.7 4.0 3.3 3.2
Obs 26 25 14 2
Austria Mean –1.8 0.3 0.7 0.9
1999–2009 Min –3.9 –0.6 –1.3 –1.3
Max –0.2 3.2 3.3 4.1
Obs 13 11 10 9
Belgium Mean –1.0 0.2 1.0 1.3
1999–2009 Min –5.9 –1.1 –1.1 –1.0
Max 0.3 2.4 6.2 6.6
Obs 13 11 10 9
Canada Mean –2.1 –0.9 –0.7 NA
1985–2008 Min –8.6 –2.6 –2.5 NA
Max 1.3 0.5 1.7 NA
Obs 26 23 20 0
Chile Mean 2.2 –1.4 NA NA
1977–2009 Min –5.5 –8.3 NA NA
Max 8.9 8.1 NA NA
Obs 33 33 0 0
Cyprus Mean –2.8 –0.2 –0.4 –0.4
2005–9 Min –6.5 –4.9 –5.1 –4.8
Max 3.3 5.3 6.6 5.7
Obs 12 5 4 3
Czech Republic Mean –4.2 –0.1 –0.3 0.4
2005–9 Min –6.8 –2.4 –1.9 –1.7
Max –1.6 5.0 3.6 3.6
Obs 13 5 4 3
Denmark Mean 1.6 0.1 0.2 0.1
1999–2008 Min –3.0 –2.8 –3.1 –2.8
Max 4.8 3.0 5.0 4.8
Obs 13 11 10 9
Estonia Mean 0.3 –0.3 0.4 1.4
2005–9 Min –3.5 –3.3 –3.4 –2.8
Max 3.4 4.1 4.1 4.2
Obs 13 5 4 3
Finland Mean 2.8 –0.5 –0.8 –0.3
1999–2009 Min –2.2 –2.5 –4.7 –3.1
Max 6.9 4.3 5.8 4.9
Obs 13 11 10 9
France Mean –3.5 0.6 1.5 2.2
1996–2009 Min –7.9 –0.5 –0.4 0.1
Max –1.5 4.0 6.2 7.0
Obs 16 14 10 9
Germany Mean –3.0 1.0 1.4 1.3
1991–2009 Min –4.8 –1.7 –2.5 –2.0
Max 0.0 3.5 3.4 3.8
Obs 19 19 18 9
Greece Mean –5.5 4.3 5.4 6.0
2000–9 Min –12.7 0.3 0.1 0.9
Max –2.9 9.0 11.9 11.5
Obs 13 10 9 8
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 Actual ﬁscal
balance
1 year ahead
budget
forecast error
2 year ahead
budget
forecast error
3 year ahead
budget
forecast error
Hungary Mean –6.1 1.7 2.2 1.9
2005–9 Min –9.3 –1.3 –0.5 0.7
Max –3.0 4.6 6.2 3.1
Obs 13 5 4 3
Ireland Mean 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.9
1999–2009 Min –11.7 –3.6 –3.6 –4.1
Max 4.7 6.3 10.6 12.3
Obs 13 11 10 9
Italy Mean –7.9 1.1 1.6 2.6
1990–2009 Min –18.1 –3.8 –3.5 0.5
Max –1.8 5.8 5.2 4.2
Obs 25 20 19 9
Latvia Mean –2.1 1.5 2.9 3.7
2005–9 Min –10.0 –1.3 –1.4 –1.4
Max 1.4 6.5 11.0 9.6
Obs 13 5 4 3
Lithuania Mean –3.4 1.4 2.7 3.7
2005–9 Min –11.9 –2.0 –1.3 –0.3
Max –0.5 7.0 9.3 9.1
Obs 13 5 4 3
Luxemburg Mean 2.3 –1.7 –1.4 –0.7
1999–2009 Min –1.2 –4.8 –4.8 –4.8
Max 6.1 2.2 2.6 4.6
Obs 13 11 10 9
Malta Mean –5.7 0.9 1.8 2.6
2005–9 Min –9.9 –0.7 –0.5 0.4
Max –1.8 3.5 3.8 3.9
Obs 13 5 4 3
Mexico Mean –0.6 0.1 NA NA
1995–2009 Min –2.3 –0.1 NA NA
Max 0.1 0.6 NA NA
Obs 15 15 0 0
Netherlands Mean –2.7 0.6 0.4 0.7
1995–2009 Min –11.0 –2.3 –2.6 –2.3
Max 1.3 7.1 5.5 5.8
Obs 17 15 10 9
New Zealand Mean 1.9 –0.1 –0.4 –0.8
1995–2008 Min –0.9 –4.2 –3.9 –0.8
Max 7.3 2.9 3.9 –0.8
Obs 18 13 12 1
Poland Mean –4.4 1.6 2.1 2.7
2005–9 Min –7.2 0.4 –0.2 –0.2
Max –2.0 4.7 5.2 6.6
Obs 13 5 4 3
Portugal Mean –3.9 1.4 2.3 3.1
1999–2009 Min –9.3 –1.0 –1.0 0.1
Max –2.7 5.4 7.8 7.8
Obs 13 11 10 9
Slovakia Mean –5.2 0.5 1.4 1.9
2005–9 Min –12.2 –0.7 –0.1 0.3
Max –2.2 3.3 4.5 4.4
Obs 13 5 4 3
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 Actual ﬁscal
balance
1 year ahead
budget
forecast error
2 year ahead
budget
forecast error
3 year ahead
budget
forecast error
Slovenia Mean –2.6 –0.2 0.9 1.5
2005–9 Min –5.7 –1.4 –1.3 –1.0
Max –0.1 0.9 5.1 4.7
Obs 13 5 4 3
South Africa Mean –1.6 –0.3 –1.3 –1.5
1998–2008 Min –5.2 –2.8 –4.0 –4.4
Max 1.7 5.6 0.9 0.2
Obs 13 11 10 9
Spain Mean –1.6 0.9 1.5 1.6
1999–2009 Min –11.4 –1.2 –1.6 –1.8
Max 2.2 5.6 12.6 12.3
Obs 13 11 10 9
Sweden Mean 0.8 0.4 0.7 1.4
1998–2009 Min –2.2 –1.7 –2.3 –2.5
Max 3.8 3.5 5.3 5.3
Obs 14 12 11 9
Switzerland Mean –0.4 –0.2 –0.2 NA
1990–2003 Min –2.2 –2.9 –2.3 NA
Max 0.8 1.4 1.0 NA
Obs 16 14 13 0
United Kingdom Mean –3.0 0.8 1.8 2.8
1997–2009 Min –12.6 –1.4 –1.9 –0.7
Max 2.7 4.5 10.2 10.9
Obs 25 13 11 9
United States Mean –2.7 0.4 1.0 3.1
1986–2009 Min –9.9 –2.2 –3.1 –0.6
Max 2.6 7.2 8.7 8.5
Obs 26 24 23 3
Total Mean –1.9 0.2 0.8 1.5
Min –18.1 –8.3 –5.1 –4.8
Max 8.9 9.0 12.6 12.3
Obs 535 399 300 179
Note: Years are those for which we have data for the 1 year ahead budget forecast error.
Appendix Table 2. Continued
Appendix Table 2: Errors in forecasting GDP growth rate (ofﬁcial forecast – actual)
Actual GDP
growth rate
1 year ahead
GDP growth rate
forecast error
2 year ahead
GDP growth
rate forecast error
3 year ahead
GDP growth
rate forecast error
Australia Mean 3.1 0.2 0.8 NA
1987–2009 Min –0.8 –2.0 0.4 NA
Max 4.6 2.8 1.1 NA
Obs 24 23 2 0
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 Actual GDP
growth rate
1 year ahead
GDP growth rate
forecast error
2 year ahead
GDP growth
rate forecast error
3 year ahead
GDP growth
rate forecast error
Austria Mean 1.9 0.1 0.9 1.0
1999–2009 Min –3.4 –1.5 –1.0 –1.2
Max 3.6 2.0 5.9 5.9
Obs 13 11 10 9
Belgium Mean 1.8 0.0 0.9 1.1
1999–2009 Min –3.1 –1.2 –1.4 –0.6
Max 3.7 1.7 5.1 5.3
Obs 13 11 10 9
Canada Mean 2.9 –0.3 0.4 NA
1985–2003 Min –1.7 –3.3 –2.6 NA
Max 5.1 2.0 4.7 NA
Obs 21 18 17 0
Chile Mean 4.9 –0.8 NA NA
1981, 1985–2008 Min –10.3 –7.3 NA NA
Max 12.3 4.6 NA NA
Obs 28 25 0 0
Cyprus Mean 3.3 0.7 1.6 2.3
2005–9 Min –1.7 –0.5 0.1 0.4
Max 5.9 3.8 5.7 5.8
Obs 13 5 4 3
Czech Republic Mean 2.6 0.8 1.7 2.6
2005–9 Min –4.0 –2.8 –2.5 –2.7
Max 6.5 7.7 9.0 8.8
Obs 13 5 4 3
Denmark Mean 1.4 0.5 0.6 1.0
1999–2009 Min –4.3 –1.9 –2.6 –2.0
Max 3.9 4.1 5.4 5.0
Obs 13 11 10 9
Estonia Mean 5.2 2.4 6.5 10.3
2005–9 Min –14.5 –4.6 –5.2 –1.1
Max 11.2 11.0 20.6 22.1
Obs 13 5 4 3
Finland Mean 2.7 0.7 0.7 0.9
1999–2009 Min –7.6 –1.7 –2.5 –2.5
Max 6.1 8.2 10.6 10.2
Obs 13 11 10 9
France Mean 1.7 0.6 1.0 1.3
1998–2009 Min –2.3 –0.9 –1.4 0.0
Max 3.9 2.7 4.8 4.6
Obs 14 12 10 9
Germany Mean 1.4 0.9 1.2 1.7
1992–2009 Min –5.0 –1.5 –1.5 –0.7
Max 3.9 5.2 6.5 6.8
Obs 20 18 18 9
Greece Mean 3.5 0.2 0.7 0.9
2000–9 Min –1.2 –1.2 –1.0 –0.6
Max 5.0 2.3 5.2 5.3
Obs 13 10 9 8
Hungary Mean 3.0 1.8 4.0 5.8
2005–9 Min –6.7 –0.1 0.3 3.0
Max 5.2 5.8 10.7 10.9
Obs 13 5 4 3
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 Actual GDP
growth rate
1y e a ra h e a d
GDP growth rate
forecast error
2 year ahead
GDP growth
rate forecast error
3y e a ra h e a d
GDP growth
rate forecast error
Ireland Mean 5.4 0.0 1.2 1.7
1999–2009 Min –7.5 –3.7 –2.9 –1.0
Max 11.4 6.7 11.0 11.5
Obs 13 11 10 9
Italy Mean 1.7 0.7 1.3 2.3
1991–2009 Min –4.8 –1.4 –0.9 0.7
Max 4.8 2.8 6.4 6.4
Obs 25 18 17 9
Latvia Mean 4.9 3.2 6.9 11.2
2005–9 Min –18.0 –5.4 –6.4 –3.6
Max 12.9 13.0 25.0 25.5
Obs 13 5 4 3
Lithuania Mean 4.8 1.5 4.3 7.0
2005–9 Min –15.0 –2.3 –3.3 –2.6
Max 10.4 10.2 19.5 19.5
Obs 13 5 4 3
Luxemburg Mean 4.3 –0.1 0.9 1.6
1999–2009 Min –3.9 –5.2 –4.7 –2.3
Max 8.6 6.9 8.9 7.9
Obs 13 11 10 9
Malta Mean 2.5 –0.3 –0.1 0.8
2005–9 Min –2.5 –3.8 –3.5 –2.5
Max 8.1 4.2 5.2 5.1
Obs 13 5 4 3
Mexico Mean 1.5 1.7 NA NA
2003–9 Min –6.5 –1.2 NA NA
Max 4.8 9.5 NA NA
Obs 8 7 0 0
Netherlands Mean 2.1 0.2 0.8 1.1
1995–2009 Min –4.0 –2.5 –1.8 –1.0
Max 4.7 5.3 5.8 5.8
Obs 17 15 10 9
New Zealand Mean 2.8 –0.3 0.3 0.4
1998–2008 Min 0.0 –1.7 –1.1 0.4
Max 4.6 2.7 4.2 0.4
Obs 13 11 10 1
Poland Mean 4.3 0.1 0.0 1.0
2005–9 Min 1.2 –1.9 –1.9 –0.9
Max 7.1 2.0 3.3 3.9
Obs 13 5 4 3
Portugal Mean 1.7 0.7 1.9 2.5
1999–2009 Min –2.7 –0.6 –0.7 0.9
Max 4.8 2.2 5.5 5.7
Obs 13 11 10 9
Slovakia Mean 4.2 0.0 0.7 1.7
2005–9 Min –5.7 –3.3 –4.3 –5.0
Max 10.4 8.1 11.5 10.8
Obs 13 5 4 3
Slovenia Mean 3.4 0.1 2.1 3.2
2005–9 Min –7.3 –1.8 –2.1 –2.1
Max 6.1 3.3 11.4 11.4
Obs 13 5 4 3
Appendix Table 2. Continued
Over-optimism in forecasts by ofﬁcial budget agencies and its implications 557
 
a
t
 
H
a
r
v
a
r
d
 
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
o
n
 
A
p
r
i
l
 
1
9
,
 
2
0
1
2
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
o
x
r
e
p
.
o
x
f
o
r
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
s
.
o
r
g
/
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 Actual GDP
growth rate
1 year ahead
GDP growth rate
forecast error
2 year ahead
GDP growth
rate forecast error
3 year ahead
GDP growth
rate forecast error
South Africa Mean 3.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
1998–2008 Min 0.4 –1.5 –1.7 –1.6
Max 5.6 2.6 2.7 2.8
Obs 13 11 10 8
Spain Mean 3.0 0.0 0.5 0.8
1999–2009 Min –3.6 –1.4 –1.8 –0.9
Max 5.1 2.2 6.6 6.9
Obs 13 11 10 9
Sweden Mean 2.2 0.4 0.4 0.7
1998–2009 Min –5.2 –2.4 –2.2 –1.8
Max 4.6 6.5 7.7 7.9
Obs 14 12 11 9
Switzerland Mean 1.1 0.9 1.1 NA
1990–2003 Min –0.7 –1.6 –1.4 NA
Max 3.4 2.7 2.7 NA
Obs 16 14 13 0
United Kingdom Mean 2.1 0.0 0.7 0.9
1998–2009 Min –4.8 –2.0 –1.5 –1.0
Max 3.8 3.8 7.6 7.3
Obs 13 12 11 9
United States Mean 2.7 0.5 0.6 3.8
1985–2009 Min –2.5 –3.1 –3.1 1.9
Max 7.0 5.5 5.6 5.6
Obs 27 25 24 2
Total Mean 2.9 0.4 1.1 1.8
Min –18.0 –7.3 –6.4 –5.0
Max 12.9 13.0 25.0 25.5
Obs 500 369 282 175
Note: Years are those for which we have data for the 1 year ahead GDP growth forecast error.
Appendix Table 3(a): Budget balance forecast error as a % of GDP, full dataset
Variables 1 year ahead 2 years ahead 3 years ahead
SGP5yr 0.000908 –0.386 –0.366
(0.426) (0.532) (0.543)
SGP5yrdevinter –0.000301 0.146 0.025
(0.115) (0.201) (0.230)
Constant 0.229 0.856*** 1.586***
(0.237) (0.272) (0.339)
Observations 398 300 179
R
2 0.000 0.008 0.002
RMSE 2.288 2.895 3.255
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